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“DEMENTIA IS A FICTION” 
KANT ON THE MENTAL DISTURBANCES 
OF THE HUMAN SOUL
by Fernando Silva (Lisbon)1
1. Mental disturbance as a topic of a pragmatic anthropology
Man is riddled with follies.2
This is how Kant inscribes the theme of mental disturbance in the 
field of his anthropological thought. At the same time, and with these 
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very words, Kant imperceptibly shifts the bleak panorama — and 
attempts to root out the consequent stigma — that has always hung 
over this topic.
Indeed, until Kant, the problem of mental disturbance was one scarcely 
considered by the learned community.3 It was, in their eyes, a danger-
ous or negative topic — perhaps the most dangerous and negative of all 
— because it revealed the unconscious or irrational in the human being 
and thus necessarily labored in obscurity and doubt. As a result, in 
treatises of psychology and anthropology, the topic of mental distur-
bance was either completely avoided because it was too sensitive, or 
mentioned in passing as something real yet shameful, or, at best, con-
sidered suitable for a specialized study only, but not for a study devoted 
to the science of man. So bleak was the previous panorama, that it was 
notable even in the works which most influenced Kant’s anthropological 
project: neither Baumgarten’s Metaphysica nor Platner’s Anthropologie für 
Aertzte und Weltweise present more than sporadic references to the topic. 
It was surely bearing in mind these and other omissions that Kant 
inaugurates his lectures on anthropology in 1772 with the words: “Psy-
chology and the healthy state of the soul are often dealt with; but not 
the sick one” (AA 25.1: 105).
The paradigm shifts with Kant’s approach. Not, however, by supposing 
that folly is to be found everywhere, or that folly burns secretly in all 
men, merely awaiting the moment of its eruption. No, for Kant has no 
interest in dealing with folly as with a mere pathology, and therefore, 
as the irrational or non-natural in man. Quite on the contrary, Kant 
intends to ascertain what is common or universal in mental disturbance 
and considers the topic from a rigorously human point of view, in the scope 
of a pragmatic anthropology. By so doing, Kant can claim that despite its 
3 Such negligence, which does not fully extend to topics akin to that of mental disturbance — 
such as obscure representations or dreams — is so widespread that few exceptions to it may be found, 
be it in the field of psychology, philosophy or anthropology. The exceptions, let it be noted, come 
from the field of medicine: namely, Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, 1621; Thomas Willis, 
Pathologiae cerebri, et nervosi generis specimen in quo agitur de morbis convulsivis et de scorbuto, 1668, 
and Affectionum quæ dicuntur hystericæ et hypochondriacæ pathologia spasmodica vindicate: Accesserunt 
exercitationes medico-physicae duae de sanguinis accensione et de motu musculari, 1670; Thomas Syden-
ham, On Epidemics, 1680, and Dissertatio epistolaris, 1682, and William Cullen, First Lines of the 
Practice of Physic, 1777, among other notable examples.
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not very flattering appearance, mental disturbance is first and foremost 
a trait of the natural in the human being. For the natural in the human 
being is not, in Kant, the same as in Baumgarten, or Platner, or any 
other author. According to Kant, the natural is that which is human in 
human beings — that which unites the individual with the whole — 
and therefore is truly anthropological.4 And so, in Kant, the topic of 
mental disturbance is, as much as possible, stripped of its excessive 
irrationality and obscurity, and seen as a topic as natural as are the 
senses, the powers of the spirit, or topics akin to aesthetics and psy-
chology. The greatest proof of Kant’s humanization — for pragmatic 
anthropologization — of the topic resides in his defense of the imagina-
tive [einbildend] nature of mental disturbance. By this, Kant intends to 
show that the illness of the human soul labors in images and in represen-
tations of objects as referred to an ideal, and that such facta resemble 
those of the multiple dispositions and re-dispositions of the various 
possible alignments of the capacity of imagination (Einbildungsfähigkeit) 
in its sane state, which result either in the creation of intellectual cogni-
tions or in the creation of sensible images (as in poetry). 
Our objective is to investigate how Kant approaches the topic of mental 
disturbance within the context of his anthropological writings.5 First, we 
shall consider Kant’s onomastic of the several species of mental disturbance, 
4 “Here we shall ascertain what in man is natural, and what in it is artificial or acquired — this 
is the hardest: to separate man, insofar as it is natural, from men carved by education and other 
influences [...]” (AA 25.1: 8,9).
5 The topic of mental disturbance in Kant has hitherto been only insufficiently approached in the 
scope of his anthropological enterprise, which is here the focus of our research. Notable exceptions of 
this general omission are: Monique David-Ménard, La folie dans la raison pure: Kant lecteur de Sweden-
borg (Paris: Vrin, 1990); Patrick Frierson, “Kant on Mental Disorder, Part 1: An Overview,” History of 
Psychiatry 20, 79 Pt. 3 (2009), 267-28; Patrick Frierson, “Kant on Mental Disorder, Part 2: Philosophi-
cal Implications of Kant’s Account,” History of Psychiatry 20, 79 Pt. 3 (2009): 290-310; Nuria S. Madrid, 
“Controlling Mental Disorder: Kant’s Account of Mental Illness in the Anthropology Writings,” in 
Knowledge, Morals and Practice in Kant’s Anthropology, ed. Gualtiero Lorini and Robert B. Louden 
(Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 147-61; Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on 
Psychopathy,” Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy 82 (1972): 284-98; 
Olaf Nohr, Vernunft als Therapie und Krankheit: Zur Geschichte medizinischer Denkfiguren in der Phi-
losophie (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2015); Constantin Rauer, Wahn und Wahrheit: Kants Auseinandersetzung 
mit dem Irrationalen (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007); Mathé Scholten, ”Schizophrenia and Moral 
Responsibility: A Kantian Essay,” Philosophia 44 (2016): 205-25; Manfred Spitzer and Brendan A. Mahe, 
eds., Philosophy and Psychopathology (New York: Springer, 1990); Helge Svare, Body and Practice in Kant 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2006); Pedro Jesús Teruel, “Die Äußere Schaale der Natur: Eine Fußnote zum 
Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes (1764),” Kant-Studien 104 (2013): 23-43.
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and through the analysis of the powers involved in them, attempt to prove 
the imaginative6 nature of mental disturbances (Section 2). Secondly, we 
aim at expounding the problem underlying Kant’s concept of mental 
disturbance: the possible bringing together of the mechanics of dis-
turbed imaginativeness and that of sane imaginativeness, and to prove 
this through their common relation to the ideal and their various 
arrangements of the powers of the mind, the best example of which is 
the similitude between the demented and the poet (Sections 2, 3). Thirdly, 
as a conclusion, we aim at separating both procedures through the 
example of Kant’s conception of “sensus proprius” and “sensus communis”; 
namely, by expounding how Kant links a representing in sensus proprius 
to the demented, and a representing in sensus communis to the creations 
of genius, or poetic creations, thereby definitively separating two applica-
tions of one and the same human capacity to imagine and putting them 
to two different practical (anthropological) uses (Section 3).
2. Mental disturbance as a (Kantian) problem 
2.1. The imaginative nature of the healthy and unhealthy states of the soul
When he first approaches the topic, Kant preemptively states that he 
does not know what mental disturbance is: “Indeed, it cannot be truly 
explained what a disturbed human being is” (PH: 155). However, in the 
6 Let it be noted beforehand that by “imaginative” we do not understand imagination as merely 
regarding the “power of imagination.” Instead, and because we are dealing here mostly with Kant’s 
Lectures on Anthropology, we respect Kant’s therein suggested distinction between “power of imagina-
tion” (Einbildungskraft), that is, one of the powers of the spirit alongside the understanding or reason, 
and the “capacity of imagination” (Einbildungsfähigkeit), that is, the “power of formation” (Bildungs-
Vermögen) (see AA 25.1: 76-78), which, according to the philosopher, is a primordial, ever-continu-
ous form of imagination which not only precedes but encapsulates the real actions of the power of 
imagination and the understanding and hence underlies all human imaginative and/or rational 
operations, as well as their manifestations, such as those of dream, wit, genius and, as is here the 
case, mental disturbance. As such, when we use the word “imaginative” on its own — the imaginative 
nature of mental disturbance — we refer to this underlying, surreptitious, all-encompassing imagi-
native activity, and not to those of power of imagination, understanding and reason in general, 
which stand here only as different palpable applications of this original imaginative capacity, be it in 
their sane state or be it in their disturbed state (that is, imbecility, insanity, dementia). 
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Lectures on Anthropology (1772-1796), in the “Essay on the Maladies 
of the Head” (1767) and in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of 
View (1798)7 Kant attempts to overcome his insipience on the theme. 
To do so, Kant often uses the method of briefly listing the various 
manifestations of disturbance — an “onomastic” (AA 2: 260) of the 
frailties and infirmities of the soul — which appear here as species (spe-
cies) regarding their genus (Gattung), the mental disturbance.8 According 
to Kant, this attempt at systematization is indeed complex; for so 
numerous, so detailed and akin are the manifestations of mental dis-
turbance, that it is often difficult to categorize the latter according to 
their causes or phenomena — not to mention to diagnose the illness 
itself.9 Perhaps for this reason, Kant’s own considerations on the subject 
seem to be exposed to this difficulty, and so, from one work to the other, 
even from one lesson to the other, Kant’s position on the subject, though 
unaltered in its essence, displays different structures, oftentimes even 
multiple nomenclatures for one and the same phenomenon, which can-
not but affect the concept of the genus and hence cause perplexity.
However, in the hope of bringing order to our view of Kant’s system 
of the illnesses of the soul, we would say that the guideline of such 
7 Despite the fact that our approach of Kant’s opinion on mental disturbance is deliberately 
confined to his anthropological writings (see annotation 5), this does not mean that Kant deals with 
folly and mental disturbance exclusively in the “Essay on the Maladies of the Head”, the Lectures on 
Anthropology (1772-1796) or the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798). The topic 
reemerges in the first and third Critiques, as well as en passant in other philosophical texts. As such, 
because Kant does deal with the topic especially in his anthropology, and does so over such a long 
period of time (1767-1798) — a period of time which encapsulates the critical period — there should 
be no doubt that Kant’s multifarious opinions on mental disturbance, herein expounded only in 
their anthropological expression, exerted an influence upon the philosophical developments that 
characterize the so-called critical period. The problematization and critical discussion of this 
influence, because it surpasses the objective of this research — the analysis of the concept of men-
tal disturbance in Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology — as well as its necessary economy, shall be left 
here untouched. But, let it be noted, both Monique David-Ménard and Constantin Rauer show us 
precisely this in their works by surpassing the anthropological scope of the topic at hand and relating 
it to Kant’s view on reason in other works, such as the Critique of Pure Reason (where the topic of 
mental disturbance is approached with regard to the dialectic nature of reason). On this see Monique 
David-Ménard, La folie dans la raison pure: Kant lecteur de Swedenborg (Paris: Vrin, 1990) and Con-
stantin Rauer, Wahn und Wahrheit: Kants Auseinandersetzung mit dem Irrationalen (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 2007).
8 See PH: 154.
9 “The gradations of the illnesses of the mind […] are so infinite that one can hardly differentiate 
them” (PH: 157-158).
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complex phenomena is dependent on Kant’s own definition of mental 
disturbance in general — the one which reappears equally throughout 
Kant’s work. Namely, mental disturbance consists of an action of the 
understanding, or reason, or the power of imagination, “directed against 
the natural laws of the human being” (AA 15.2: 212),10 and hence 
against laws that ensure the healthy proportion of the powers of the 
human being. As such, then, the disturbance always implies a dispro-
portion, a disharmony of the powers of the spirit, which is opposed to 
the more or less perfect proportion found in sane human beings. Kant 
names this “a disharmonious disposition of the forces of the mind in 
illnesses” (PH: 155), or “[a] complete untuning of the forces of the mind, 
which do not act in the same proportion as in the healthy state of human 
beings” (PH: 154).
As such, it is Kant’s opinion that “the frailties of the disturbed head 
can be brought under as many different main genera as there are men-
tal capacities that are afflicted by it” (AA 2: 264). And bearing this in 
mind, Kant proceeds to distinguish the various illnesses under the 
genus of disturbance into four different parts:11 imbecility (imbecilitas), 
the error residing here in the understanding; insanity (insania), the error 
residing in the power of judgment; dementia (dementia), the error resid-
ing in the power of imagination; and folly (vesania), the error residing 
in reason.
We now undertake a more precise rendition of the distinction between 
the several species of mental disturbance. This distinction is resumed 
in other works not exactly in the same manner, but by dividing the 
topic into disturbances due to insufficiency (frailties of the mind) and 
disturbances due to perversion (illnesses of the mind) — to be sure, the 
insufficiency or perversion of the objects represented by each disturbance, 
which in turn is caused precisely due to the errors and disproportions of the 
powers of the mind. Hence, regarding the frailties of the mind, Kant 
distinguishes between many species, such as “Stumpfheit” (obtusus), 
10 “He by whom the actions of the understanding are directed against their natural laws, is 
deranged” (AA 15.2: 212).
11 This first distinction is reproduced here in accordance with Anthropologie Dohna (see PH: 155).
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“Dummheit” (stupiditas), “Einfältigkeit” (simplicitas), and “Zerstreuung” 
(distractio), among others. Above all these, amentia (amentia), “the inca-
pacity to bring one’s representations to a necessary connection to the 
possibility of experience” (AA 7: 214) — namely, the deficit or “impo-
tency” (AA 2: 263) of representing things —, and imbecility (Blödsin-
nigkeit), which is disproportionate because it presupposes acute senses, 
but a frailty of the understanding, are the gravest of all the frailties of 
the mind (Gemütsschwächen), but therefore less harmful than any illness 
of the mind (Gemütskrankheiten). As to the illnesses of the mind, or the 
disturbances by excess or by “perversion” (AA 2: 263) of representabil-
ity, the distinction is more detailed. According to Kant, derangement 
(Verrücktheit) is “the perversion of the concepts of experience” (AA 2: 
264) in general. As from this point in disturbance, the individual lives 
as in a dream, he is “a dreamer in walking”, for “he is used to represent-
ing certain things as clearly sensed of which nevertheless nothing is 
present” (265). Resuming the order in Anthropology-Dohna, Kant 
states that Insanity (Wahnwitzigkeit) derives from derangement, but still 
only faintly. It shows disharmony of the powers insofar as the power of 
judgment thinks to be here in a supreme degree and deems itself in 
position to discern and reason with supernatural precision (see PH: 157). 
This arises when the power of judgment “errs in a nonsensical manner 
in imagined more subtle judgments concerning universal concepts”, for 
instance, the interpretation of prophecies or the mensuration of the 
extension of an ocean (AA 2: 268). Dementia (Wahnsinnigkeit) is per-
haps the amplest of all the disturbances, and in it the lack of balance 
between powers focuses on the power of imagination, which in this 
state strives to realize fantasies; that is, it holds fantasies as real things. 
Namely, in it occurs a weak use of the senses, but possibly a good 
understanding and surely an exacerbated fantasy. From such incongru-
ence between powers arise manifestations as far apart as hypochondria, 
in which the individual is conscious of his state, and the visionary, 
the fantast, the enthusiast or the fanatic, all of them unconscious of 
their state and in their unconsciousness perverting their own notions of 
objects. Lastly, folly (Aberwitz), “the illness of a disturbed reason”, con-
sists of “the ill of the soul flying over the ladder of experience and 
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snatching principles which may be far superior to the touchstone of 
experience, and pretending to comprehend the incomprehensible” 
(AA 7: 215). Examples of this are: “The invention of the quadrature of 
the circle, of the Perpetuum mobile, the unveiling of the supernatural 
forces of nature” (215), among others. This latter stage, Kant says, stands 
before the worst manifestation of mental disturbance: that of madness 
(Tollheit).
Now, in view of this, we may infer that such an onomastic order of the 
several species of mental disturbance presents an evolution, in ascending 
gravity, and subsequent ascending difficulty of treatment, of pathological 
manifestations. And, according to Kant, this evolution is directly dependent 
on a disproportion of the powers of the mind, namely, an uncommon 
insufficiency or excess of a particular power which generates dishar-
mony between the remaining powers and launches the patient in an 
infirm state. No doubt because of this, Kant always insists on the spe-
cific power whose degree is the cause of error and shows this through 
examples of irregular thoughts or procedures thus generated. 
However, while proceeding with such examples, Kant not only bears 
in mind the cause, but especially the product of the disproportion. Kant 
is indeed interested in the fact that such manifestations of human life 
are enrooted in the disarrangement of the human powers; but he is 
especially concerned with their direct product, that is, the representation 
of such manifestations in the human soul — a representation which is the 
direct fruit of the different possible combinations of the powers of the mind. 
Not by chance, Kant refers to the “tumultuary” disturbance of the 
representations of amentia, to the “methodic” disturbance of the repre-
sentations of dementia, to the “fragmentary” disturbance of the repre-
sentations of insanity, and to the much graver “systematic” nature of 
the disturbed representations (AA 7: 215-216): thus signifying that, at 
its basis, the different manifestations of disturbance do indeed have an 
occult cause in the disproportion of the powers of the mind, but a visible 
consequence in the representations of the human soul, which are to be 
manifested either in tumult, or in fragment, or in melancholy, or in 
delirium, or in superstition, and so forth. In other words, and bearing 
in mind the nature of such examples, we would say that Kant ascribes 
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importance to a better or worse concatenation of the powers of the 
mind, which is at the basis of his onomastic and hence of his taxonomy 
of mental disturbance. But because, according to Kant himself, “the 
soul of every human being is occupied, even in the healthiest state, in 
painting all sorts of images of things which are not present, or also in 
completing some imperfect resemblance in the representation of present 
things” (AA 2: 264); that is, because, be it in its healthy or in its dis-
turbed state, be it in its conscious or unconscious state, the human soul 
is by nature imaginative (einbildend), then Kant must ascribe an even 
greater relevance to the fact that this good or bad joint disposition of the 
powers of the mind always influences directly the capacity of human repre-
sentation, and therefore — and here is the core of the question — is itself 
of such an imaginative nature: “Dementia is a fiction” (PH: 156)12; or 
better still: “Illusion is designated as fiction” (AA 25.1: 108).13 Hence, 
just as the healthy relations of the powers of the mind, its proportion(s)14 
and their different products are of a fictive order,15 so must be the dis-
turbed, infirm relations of the powers of the mind, the illusion (Wahn) and 
its products — and therefore, so must the disproportion by insufficiency, or 
by perversion of the powers of the mind, be of an imaginative order which 
is the same as saying that imagination — in its original fictive dimen-
sion, as “Einbildung” — is present, either in greater or lesser degree, in 
all forms of human disturbance. The disproportion of the powers, and 
their respective disturbance in the soul, thus have direct influence on 
an impotent, for insufficient, or an excessive, for perverted, connection 
between the object of experience and human representations or images. 
And as such, dementia, amentia, derangement, and folly, among others, 
12 “Wahnsinn ist eine Einbildung” (PH: 156).
13 “Wahn heißet Einbildung” (AA 25.1: 108).
14 Namely, the power of re-imagination (Nachbildungsvermögen), the power of imagination (Ein-
bildungsvermögen) and the power of pre-imagination (Vorbildungsvermögen), as they are presented, 
for instance, in AA 25.1: 76-7.
15 “Dementia is a fiction” (PH: 156). “Fiction,” a central concept in this research, is here and 
throughout the text understood as the imaginative capacity for representational (and/or po(i)etic) 
composition (hence our option as a possible translation of “Einbildung”). By it we mean to stress not 
the current sense of the word, but its original sense, which is of an imaginative order which renders 
it adjacent to the formative, fictive (fictis, fingendi), poietical character of all human representations 
as presented by Kant in his anthropological lectures on wit or genius. 
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are therefore distinguishable through the more or less disproportional 
treatment they apply to the image of an object, and how that treatment 
is to be reproduced in the conduct of the mentally infirm.
2.2.  The longing for an ideal as the common ground of sane and insane 
mental states 
Kant explains the previous conclusions in greater detail and thereby 
identifies another problematic aspect, one which he often approaches in 
lectures on mental disturbance and uses as further proof of the imagina-
tive nature of the infirmities of the soul. 
As was described above, according to Kant the different species of 
disturbance arise from a disarrangement of the powers of the mind. 
This disarrangement is one that is common to all the general formative 
faculties (Bildungs-Vermögen) of the human being: it is of an imagina-
tive nature and, as such, it tends to arise as differently as the different 
powers of the spirit in which it emerges. This is why Kant divides the 
disturbances of the soul according to the power of the spirit affected, 
as well as the feebler or graver manifestations (representations) drawn 
from the latter. As such, we reiterate, imbecility or dementia, which may 
serve here as examples, are antipodes, and the reason for their separation 
is manifest. Namely, in the imbecile, representations are devoid of 
image, for in him the senses are strong, but the power of imagination, 
and therefore the understanding, are barely present; that is, one could 
say that in him ideas dissipate, they lose their reality to the point that 
they evanesce in ideality — hence his insufficiency in representing. 
Whereas in the demented, the opposite takes place: “The demented goes 
beyond the senses […], demented is then he who substitutes the things 
of imagination as real” (AA 25.1: 108).16 Namely, demented individuals 
realize their fantasies; they “believe to feel what they imagine”, or 
rather, “they believe they feel in things more than what is really there” 
(AA 25.1: 105), and therefore, in the fantast, whom Kant designates as 
16 “Der Wahnsinnige geht weiter als die Sinne […], wahnsinnig ist also der, der die Sachen der 
Einbildung als würcklich substituiret” (AA 25.1: 108). 
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a daydreamer17 and oftentimes compares to a poet,18 ideas, which are 
perverted by an excessive power of imagination and a timid use of the 
senses, lose in ideality until they seem to come to reality.
According to Kant, however, these disarrangements of powers and 
their images have a common ground, one which they share with the 
normal, healthy arrangement of the same powers in mental sanity. Kant 
articulates this common ground in Anthropology-Collins,19 and desig-
nates it as the envisagement of an ideal — in this case, an ideal of repre-
sentativity, or human imagination. For it is Kant’s view that in the nor-
mal disposition of the powers, and the sanity of their products, a 
longing for the ideal is always to be discerned. This longing is inherent 
to man, and it is even more visible in the case of human imagination, 
where we represent and therefore deal with the greater or lesser “novelty 
of the thing”: “All novelty of the thing causes one to believe he feels 
more in the thing than what is really there” (AA 25.1: 105).20 There is, 
then, in human representations, and in their eminently imaginative or 
inventive nature, a longing towards an ideal. 
The proof of this is in what follows. According to the philosopher, 
the quest for the ideal is indeed characteristic of the human being. Now, 
here as well as in the third Critique, it is Kant’s view that the obtention 
of the ideal is however impossible: “In its most complete degree it is in 
concreto impossible” (AA 25.1: 106). But the fact that it is impossible 
in concreto, in its completeness, does not mean that it is so in abstracto, 
that is, in contemplation. And hence, Kant explains, there are two ways 
of envisaging the ideal: either one sees it “as a means of appreciation 
(principium dijudicandi)” (106) — that is, by taking the ideal regu-
latively, knowing beforehand that it is indeed remote, but in awareness 
of the possibility of its finite approximation; or one sees it “as the object 
of desire that we seek (principium practicum)” (106), that is, one takes 
17 See AA 2: 265; AA 7: 202; AA 25.2: 1008.
18 See AA 7: 202; AA 7: 215.
19 Namely, in “Of the fantast and of the disturbed human being, or of the ill state of the soul” 
(AA 25.1: 105-106).
20 “Alle Neüigkeit der Sache trägt hiezu bey, man glaubt bey der Sache mehr zu empfinden, als 
würcklich da ist” (AA 25.1: 105).
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the ideal constitutively, knowing that it [the ideal] is reachable and in 
actual attainment of the latter. Or, in other words: either one takes the 
ideal as does Kant oftentimes in his work, which Kant considers to be 
the only viable option as, for example, in the case of the ideal of per-
petual peace,21 or the ideal of perfectibility of the human species,22 or 
the ideal of the perfect constitution of our universe,23 or one takes the 
ideal as an immediate, direct approximation or even appropriation of 
the absolute, which Kant considers to be erroneous. Now, in the face 
of this, one must infer the following: the correct aspiration to the ideal 
is surely that undertaken by the sane man, through the proportion of 
the powers of the mind and its harmonious products, using the ideal as 
“a means of appreciation” (106). But, because there is no reason to believe 
that in the state of disturbance our spirit follows laws other than those of 
the state of mental health,24 — which is proved by their mutual compli-
ance to the laws of the capacity of imagination — there is also no 
reason why one should not think that the disturbed man is guided by the 
same law of imagination, and that this law of imagination envisages the same 
ideal as it does in the sane man: in what is surely a reversely disposed law 
of imagination (the ideal as “the object of desire that we seek” (106)), 
but the law of imagination nonetheless. Indeed, this is the case. And, as 
such, from one extreme of the table of the disturbances of the soul to 
the other one progresses, though with different intensities and degrees 
21 Kant’s whole project towards a perpetual peace is proof of the (remote, yet possible) feasibility 
of an ideal; as is Kant’s conception of a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view, expressed 
in 1784, according to which there is a “consoling perspective on the future […] in which the human 
species will be represented at a great distance: how, at last, it will elevate itself through work to the 
state in which all the germs that nature laid in it may be fully developed, and its destination on 
Earth fulfilled” (AA 8: 30). 
22 See Kant’s lecture on Anthropology – Friedländer (AA 25.1: 675-697) entitled: “Of the char-
acter of humankind in general [”Vom Charakter der Menschheit überhaupt”]: “This consideration 
[the idea(l) of the perfectibility of man] is quite agreeable, insofar as it is an idea that is possible, to 
which however millennia will still be required” (AA 25.1: 696).
23 In Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, Kant refers to the ideal constitution of the 
universe and all that is in it. Referring to this, Kant says that “millions and mountains of millions of 
centuries [are required] in order [for the universe] to form itself and attain perfection” (AA 1: 313). 
But such a state is possible, and shall be attained, so says the philosopher.
24 Paraphrasis of Kant’s words relating to the unconsciousness of dreams, which may here apply 
to the unconsciousness or irrationality of mental disturbances: “One has no cause at all to believe that 
in the state of being awake our mind follows other laws than in our sleep” (AA 2: 264). 
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of success, towards the (imaginative) realization of an ideal — as does the 
sane man, who thus envisages the same ideal. In other words, it is Kant’s 
opinion that from the faintest case of imbecility, which is surely charac-
terized by the insufficiency of its images and therefore seems to aim at a 
degree-zero of representation (through similarity, as close to the object 
as possible), to the utmost case of dementia, which renders visible a 
perversion of the image, which renders the image real and therefore 
aims at a quasi-palpable representation (through sensible incarnation of 
the object), all attempt one and the same thing: to tend towards a human 
ideal representation of an object: an ideal which, in Kant’s words, “signi-
fies the maximum of a thing, insofar as I think that thing from myself, 
without any senses” (AA 25.1: 105).
Now, one could ascertain that Kant sees sane and insane represent-
ability as founded on the same imaginative trunk. Here he distinguishes 
between “a good and useful” way of connecting the representations of 
the soul to their ideal, namely, a correct way of aspiring to gradually 
bring representations to an equal condition with objects; one which is 
founded upon a proportion of the powers. This shows mental sanity 
from its executor and an erroneous way of bringing images, de facto, to 
the condition of objects: a way which is founded upon a disproportion 
of the powers as is visible in the fantast, the fanatic, and the imbecile 
which therefore shows mental disturbance from the part of its executor. 
This distinction, seems to be incontrovertible insofar as it seems to 
propose one path as good and another one as bad and hence is a distinc-
tion which could explain Kant’s position on the whole problem. 
However, this is not the case, because precisely where the problem 
seems to subside lies its true kern. The explanation of this turnaround 
is simple and has to do with Kant’s notion of (good) proportion and 
(bad) disproportion of the powers of the mind. For, if we read atten-
tively Kant’s lectures on the different powers of the mind,25 we will see 
that these powers establish multiple relations and assume multiple forms 
25 For instance, in “Von den Bildungs-Vermögen” (AA 25.1: 76-78); in “Von dem Vermögen über 
alle diese BildungsVermögen zu disponiren” (AA 25.1: 85-87), as well as in several thematic lectures 
on memory, power of imagination, wit, or genius contained in volume 25 of the Akademie-Ausgabe.
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between themselves which leads us to assume that what Kant under-
stands as a (good) proportion or a (bad) disproportion is not something fixed 
and unilateral, rather, it is something heterogeneous. Kant himself explains 
why. According to him, there are several dispositions, ones surely better, 
others not as good — but even so not disproportional — of the powers 
of the mind in a sane state. As an example, we evoke the concatenation: 
rational memory / reproductive power of imagination / understanding, a 
logical, quasi-mathematical concatenation of powers which merely pro-
duces repeated representations, and therefore does not stimulate and 
advance the spirit, but which in no way is disproportional or a mark of 
disturbance. For instance: the concatenation judicious memory / repro-
ductive power of imagination / understanding, is one which is supposedly 
optimal for philosophy; or the concatenation ingenious memory / produc-
tive power of imagination / understanding, the concatenation of poetic 
creation, which, with the necessary aid of wit and genius, enlivens the 
spirit with new representations and thus favor the spirit.26
As such, all these states are examples of possible manifestations of 
proportions of the powers of the human soul and only faint modulations 
in the strength or weakness of one or the other power distinguish them 
amongst themselves and from various other sub-dispositions of the 
sane proportion of the powers of the soul. Indeed, precisely the same 
modulations that we witnessed in the plane of mental disturbance whose 
onomastic, but also the manifestation of its various sub-species, must 
rely on the very treatment of images and their relation with objects. The 
reason of being of the proportion of all these sane dispositions seems to 
be obvious: for they grow from the intention of attaining, through their 
very images, an ideal of human representativeness. They each form a 
relation between object and image; a relation which may be one aiming 
at a degree-zero of image — as is the case in the first, more rational 
disposition of the proportion of the mind — or the ideal of a total-degree 
of the image — embodied in the ideal of poetry, which aims at sensual-
izing the image. But this, we underscore, is also the case with the plane 
of mental disturbance; namely, that of imbecility (degree-zero of images) 
26 On Kant’s different associations of the powers of the mind, see AA 25.1: 756; AA 25.2: 1463; 
AA 15.2: 148; AA 7: 182-184.
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and dementia (total-degree of images), which also seek the ideal. Hence, 
this leads us to two conclusions: 1) that there is indeed a good and a bad 
method, a sane and an infirm aspiration to the ideal. But 2), that these 
methods are not to be distinguished except insofar as they are to be 
deemed the inversion of one and the same method. This means that 
between the good, sane proportion (or proportions) of the human soul 
and the bad, infirm disproportion (or disproportions) of the human soul, 
there is not just a difference, or a linear option between good and bad. 
Rather, there is also a connection. And not just any connection, but a 
mutual mirroring, indicative of a common origin, procedure and end. For, 
one could say, the powers of the mind in their sane, greater or lesser 
proportion, are like a mirror of the powers of the mind in their insane, 
greater or lesser disproportion. An inverted mirror, to be sure; but a mir-
ror nonetheless, identifying equal powers, proceeding through one and 
the same law — the imaginative one — and tending towards one and 
the same ideal: that of human representativeness.
At this point and in face of the previous degrees of proof of the affin-
ity between the infirmity and the health of the human soul, let us 
undertake a deductive exercise through which we intend to fully explain 
the problem at hand. In order to do so, let us depart from a belief of 
community between mental sanity and disturbance. The facts drawn 
from this are now evident. As such, then, the sane disposition of the 
powers of the mind consists of an alignment, or several alignments of 
the various powers, having in view the designation of objects, events, 
and experiences. The same is the case with the disturbed disposition of 
those very powers. Furthermore, from that ascending alignment, or 
alignments, results a certain order of representations, now akin, now 
differentiated, and those representations envisage the previously men-
tioned designation of objects, and the same is the case with the infirm 
disposition of these powers. In addition to this, such a designation via 
images depends on the powers, and the powers depend on the images, 
the relation with the ideal depends on both and their interdependence, 
and the same is the case with the disturbed plane of the powers. 
To summarize, given that the communion between mental sanity and 
insanity is stated in every step of a same, yet inverted, process, then we 
ask: is it not possible to state more than just a mere mirroring connection 
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between proportion and disproportion, sane and infirm: one which almost 
seems to render both planes of the human spirit undistinguishable? Further-
more, given such an intimate communion between a good and a bad 
concatenation of the powers of the mind, then we ask: upon approaching 
the point that is most visible, that of a total-degree of human representa-
tiveness, which is simultaneously sought by the best possible proportion 
of the sane human powers, the poetic disposition, and by the gravest stages 
of human mental disturbance, such as that of dementia or derangement, 
can we not see a very real connection between the latter: a perhaps unsus-
pected connection between poetry, wit, genius, dementia, and even madness? 
Our problem lies in Kant’s answer: yes, we can and we should discern 
between poetic creation and folly more than just a casual similarity, more 
than a mere relation; and yes, there is between both planes of fantasy 
more than mere proximity. The proofs of this are truly unequivocal: for 
in describing the sane concatenations and proportions of the powers of 
the mind, Kant often alerts to the danger that, due to the excess of one 
or other creative power, or the insufficiency of an intellectual one, wit 
or genius may easily overflow into excess and folly.27 On the other 
hand, in lectures on mental disturbance, Kant oftentimes interposes the 
topic of poetry, of dream, to the extent that sometimes he almost delib-
erately mixes the fantast and the poet28: “Madness […], just as the 
poetic enthusiasm ( furor poeticus), borders on genius” (AA 7: 202), or: 
“The demented of this order [deranged] is not to be healed: because he, 
just as poetry in general, is creative and to entertain through multiplicity” 
(AA 7: 215).
27 Not fortuitously, Kant often approaches the topics of wit or genius and the excesses of the 
human soul in the same lectures. As an example of this, Kant warns against the risk of the images 
of wit deceiving us (AA 25.1: 316), or the danger that wit might be no more than “[...] a turmoil of 
representations which is very harmful to the concepts of the understanding” (AA 25.2: 1463). Fur-
thermore, he states that the exacerbated imagination of the genius deceives, obscures and confounds 
the understanding (cf. AA 25.2: 887, 1229).
28 Examples of this are Kant’s study of the topic of dream, wherein the philosopher closely 
connects the consciousness and unconsciousness (and hence the rationality and irrationality) of the 
human spirit around one and the same imaginative or poietical process — a process that is also inti-
mately connected with the ideal of human representability; or Kant’s treatment of the topic of 
obscure representations, also bordering between the sane and not-sane states of the human soul due to 
its imaginative-poetical nature and therefore also related to the (possible or impossible) attainability of 
the ideal of human representations.
101963_TVF_81-4_02_Silva.indd   672 9/01/20   11:50
“DEMENTIA IS A FICTION” 673
In summary, our problem lies in the present quasi-undifferentiation 
of the sane and disturbed states of the human soul in their natural imagina-
tive procedures. Hence, we now propose to attempt to distinguish such 
states, so as to perceive Kant’s position on them. That is, we ask along 
with Kant if there is not a distinctive sign that allows us to differentiate 
“between derangement and fantasizing” (AA 25.2: 1014). Namely, “if 
there is not a state through which the state of a demented is differentiated 
from that of fantasy” (1012). 
3.  Between genius and madness: The key factor of sensus 
communis
Kant undertakes the analysis of this problem, of the almost undistin-
guishable relation between genius and mental disturbance, in a lecture 
entitled “Of the fantast,” in Anthropology – Menschenkunde (1781/82). 
Herein, Kant deals with the complex problem according to which, at 
the corollary of the imaginative process of the disturbed state, as well 
as in its correspondent in the sane state, in poetry, “imagination deceives 
the senses; one believes he sees that which one can never observe as an 
object of experience” (AA 25.2: 1007). In question here is then the fan-
tast, who “realizes ideas” (1006), who thinks he is “an exalted one who, 
so to say, is inspired by God” (1007) (is in a raptus) and therefore walks 
the earth as “a dreamer in daytime who during his dream cannot con-
vince himself that he dreams and that his dream contains no truth” 
(1008); and the poet, who, as it seems, shares this problem and is object 
of all the latter accusations; and so similar are their procedures that between 
fantasy and dementia there seems to be almost no difference.
As he sets forth towards ascertaining the differences between these 
two procedures, Kant departs from one specific point: the belief that 
the difference between the fantasy of poets and the fantasy of disturbed 
individuals depends on their use of the understanding;29 namely, on the 
29 See Kant’s words: “One has never seen a demented child. The absurd comes about only when 
the understanding matures” (AA 15.2: 211).
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different dispositions assumed by the understanding in one and the 
other cases, and subsequently in the multiple dispositions of the afore-
mentioned powers. Hence, according to Kant, the question depends on 
the assumption of the understanding as sensus communis, the “bon sens 
or the sane human understanding”, or its assumption as sensus proprius 
(AA 25.2: 1012) — the understanding strictu sensu. Now, the under-
standing strictu sensu is indelibly valid and necessary, and no other 
understanding is employed in philosophical reasoning. But, Kant 
adduces, “We human beings are so constituted that we do not appreci-
ate all things from the point of view of our own understanding and 
taste, rather we posit ourselves in the position of a communitarian under-
standing and taste, and according to it we appreciate things” (1012); and 
this because, Kant proceeds, “to experience if in the apperception there 
may lie appearance, one must use the concordance of others. We need 
the eye of others to correct our own” (1013). For this one needs the 
sensus communis, that special disposition of the human understanding 
which is justly deemed as sane, or common understanding, and whose 
characteristic is to be a guarantee of correction, a certainty of the common 
or general truth of representations or images of the human soul, which 
these must always have if they are to be deemed as human cognition: 
“When we say something, this truth must be valid not only for us, but 
it must also be in accord with the judgments of others” (1012). Hence, 
it is between the sensus proprius, or private understanding, as the touch-
stone of the truth that things have to the individual, and the sensus 
communis, or common understanding, as the touchstone of the truth 
that things have to a community of individuals, that the fate of such 
representations will have to be decided, upon their extraction from 
experience and their submission to the scrutiny of the understanding. 
From the concord between these two dimensions of the understanding 
there must arise truth: “Truth is the concordance with the general 
human understanding” (1013).
Now, the examination of this double scrutiny, which we attempt here 
firstly with regard to the sane state, directly follows our reflection on 
the imaginative nature of human representation; for depending on the 
special concatenation of the powers of the mind in a sane state, the 
101963_TVF_81-4_02_Silva.indd   674 9/01/20   11:50
“DEMENTIA IS A FICTION” 675
emergence of a greater or lesser degree of sensus communis must be 
brought about and this, in turn, brings about different degrees of vali-
dation of those very concatenations. 
Hence, in the rational concatenation of the powers, a scarce but real 
degree of sensus communis is necessary; for in this rational concatenation 
there is already a sufficiently strong degree of understanding in general, 
which, held by all as equal so to say, forms generally known truths and 
thus substitutes the sensus communis. Of this one could say, then, that 
the sensus communis is here in such high immanence that its actual pres-
ence is barely required.
As to the intellectual concatenation, a greater degree of sensus com-
munis is necessary; and yet, only as much as is necessary for the under-
standing to work properly.
As to the ingenious-poetic concatenation — that which truly matters 
to our research — what happens here? Here, one could say, there takes 
place a natural and very intense manifestation of the sensus communis. 
The reason for this is simple. Namely, in this disposition of the powers 
of the mind, ingenious memory revolves images from among a whirl-
wind of past experiences, buried under the dust of time, images which 
are meticulously chosen — for bearing a moderate degree of fantasy — 
and thus transmitted to the power of imagination.30 The power of 
imagination, here in its productive disposition, and with the aid of wit 
and genius, unites said representations to others in a hitherto unsus-
pected connection, thus forming images if not new per say, at least new 
to the understanding; and in this momentary whirlwind (the poetic 
enthusiasm), the power of imagination submits these new images to the 
understanding. Now, since these images, the images of poetry, or of 
purely imaginative creation, are characterized by their novelty, their 
inventiveness, their singular feeling, they are naturally seen as dangerous 
by the understanding; and this by the understanding in general, regard-
less of its dimension. But, according to Kant, the images of poetry are 
30 “Fantasy is like a restless activity, it is, so to say, a torrent of images which flows ceasslessly. 
These images are sometimes known to us, sometimes not; here an image enlivens the other, and that 
goes on and on, endlessly” (AA 25.1: 314).
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nothing but beneficial since the poet is no prestidigitator, because he 
does not deceive,31 rather momentarily entertains the understanding 
through a play32 on images which the latter would otherwise reject. In a 
word, because the images of the poet are indeed honest and true, then, 
once the whirlwind is through, such true images, because they are so 
in a color other than that of grey experience, and because they thus 
direct rationality towards a progress which it would not attain by itself, 
must be accepted as such by the understanding. This means that, 
regardless of its disposition, the understanding has the natural tendency 
to promptly negate such images; but given the nature of poetic images 
and their special attributes, given their general truth and their relation 
to the ideal of human representativeness, the understanding is led to 
concede them. For this to happen, a high degree of sensus communis is 
required to validate the general, communitarian acceptance of such 
images. Hence, once imbued with this disposition, what happens is that 
the understanding sensus proprius accepts such images and by so doing 
is validated not only in itself, but in general, and this in such a way that 
the knowledge hereby validated, which is true, can and deserves to be 
communicated to others. Namely, such a validation of the understand-
ing sensus proprius is amplified and reflected in an understanding sensus 
communis, simply because the images of poetry are universally commu-
nicable and universally understandable.33 Hence, one could conclude 
that the images of poetry have no folly, no mental disturbance in them. 
They rather propose their very own logic, a logic perhaps illogical, of a 
31 In the text “Entwurf zu einer Opponenten-Rede” (AA 15.2: 903-935), Kant speaks of “char-
latains [...] demagogues [...] and even hyerophants” who, “with the objective of profit, deceived the 
unsuspecting crowd”; a trick, the philosopher says, which is “completely contrary to the spirit of 
poets, whose hearts are hardly moved by the cupidity of gold” (905).
32 In the text “Entwurf zu einer Opponenten-Rede” Kant mentions a playful appearance, in a 
word, a play created by poets with the specific purpose of enlivening and vivifying, thus “flattering 
the ears and, by means of fictionalized images of things, stimulating and enjoying the spirit” (AA 15.2: 
906).
33 See § 49 of the third Critique: “the happy relation, which no science can teach and no dili-
gence learn, of finding ideas for a given concept on the one hand and on the other hitting upon the 
expression for these, through which the subjective disposition of the mind that is thereby produced, 
as an accompaniment of a concept, can be communicated to others. The latter talent is really that 
which is called spirit: […] to express what is unnamable in the mental state in the case of a certain 
representation and to make it universally communicable [...]” (AA 5: 317). 
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singular relation between the sensus proprius and the sensus communis and, 
as such, it is only their transition from sensus proprius to sensus commu-
nis which, as we have seen, is so singular and complex, which ascribes 
the creations of poetry the appearance of absurd, disturbed images.
Now, in light of this, how to consider the manifestations of mental 
disturbance which Kant indeed identifies with those of poetry? The 
course of our analysis, we believe, may be similar to the previous one. 
As such, one may affirm that imbecility, which is the least grave of all 
disturbances, has a lesser or weaker use of the understanding; which to 
us, who work now with two dimensions of the human understanding, 
means that the imbecile only has commonly known cognitions, oper-
ates with commonly accepted representations, and has difficulty in 
thinking for himself, let alone being inventive and original. His relation 
to the ideal of inventiveness is to him therefore nearly unknown. 
In him, one could say, the understanding is in scarce degree; to be sure, 
the understanding is in the sensus proprius; for the sensus communis, 
more sensible in nature, exists here in high degree. The same is the case 
with amentia, or the “impotency” of the representation of things. How-
ever, from derangement onwards — that is, from the point in the scale 
of mental disturbance in which the derangement starts acting not by 
impotency, but by perversion — the case is different, insofar as there is 
an inversion of the weights of the two dimensions of the understanding: 
one wherein the sensus communis tends to disappear and the sensus proprius 
of the understanding tends to emerge. Namely, from derangement onwards, 
to insanity, which consists of perverting universal concepts through an 
exacerbated use of the power of judgment, to dementia, which consists 
of holding as real ideal things, and folly, which believes to be in pos-
session of all the mysteries of the world; in all these there are not just 
degrees of an ascending scale in the gravity of the mental disturbance, 
or different manifestations of disproportion or disharmony of the pow-
ers of the mind. No. In all these there is first and foremost a scale of 
inversion of the general disposition of the human mind, once again centered 
in the human understanding: namely, one in which there takes place a 
gradual decrease in the intervention of the sensus communis and a simul-
taneous gradual increase in the influence of the sensus proprius. This, in 
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turn, leads us to an important conclusion: that, according to Kant, the 
previous characteristics of mental disturbances, and their respective 
weighing factors, such as its greater or lesser gravity, or imaginative 
intensity, or degree of practical belief in the ideal all are, in their accen-
tuation, intimately connected with the simultaneous intensification of the 
sensus proprius of human understanding and the subsequent dis-intensifi-
cation of the sensus communis. Hence, if one considers the evolutive table 
of the problematic powers in the different manifestations of distur-
bance, what this means is that, as the sensus proprius augments, and the 
sensus communis disappears, 1) the gravity of the illness is indeed greater, 
but not just because its expressions become more pungent, rather 
because they become more enrooted and more intimate — more torn 
from common reality and the living community, in their bearer; 2) the 
imaginative intensity of representations is indeed greater, but not just 
because this is its natural tendency, rather because, according to Kant, 
this takes place in the exact measure in which the sensus communis 
decreases — and hence, with the disappearing of the sensus communis, 
all powers, but especially that of fantasy, are unbridled and naturally 
fall into excess; 3) the belief in the ideal is indeed greater, but not just 
because that is the natural outcome of an evolution, rather because the 
loss of contact with what is commonly accepted, with what is general, 
results in an introversion of the images produced and therefore in a 
complete omission of the truth of representations (something which 
only the sensus communis may provide). In Kant’s words:
The sensus communis is differentiated from the sensus proprius, where one 
cares not for the judgments of others; the disturbed man judges everything 
according to the sensus proprius and cannot consider anything from the 
point of view of the sensus communis; before all objects he takes advice only 
from his private sense. (AA 25.2: 1013-1014)
Let us then one last time take the fantast as the superior example of 
these considerations. It is a characteristic of his, as seems to be that of 
the poet, to hold as real things which do not exist: to realize that which 
is ideal and hence to be in position of attaining the ideal of the relation 
image-object. In this sense, he is indeed the poet; and it is so because, 
through an excessive use of the power of imagination, both the fantast 
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and the poet create new representational compositions, they extract new 
images from the ones they previously had. One could even deem the 
fantast a genius, and hence truly ingenious. Kant does not deny this. 
However — Kant adduces — here lies a great difference. For it is visible 
that in the demented the sensus proprius of his understanding is in 
extremely high degree, which must of course be accompanied with an 
equally vibrant power of imagination. Therefore, in the fantast, there 
lies in much smaller degree the sensus communis, which precisely should 
regulate the intensity of one’s belief in the realization of individual 
representations, but which, in its absence, rather gives rise to the latter’s 
exacerbation. As to the poet, precisely the opposite takes place: in him 
the sensus proprius is very low, and the sensus communis very high. And 
hence, one could say, in the fantast occurs precisely the same disposition 
of the powers as in the poet, or the genius. But this disposition is 
inversely brought forth, or inversely put into practice by both parties 
which precisely makes them now coincide, now separate from each other, 
within the scope of a pragmatic anthropology or, in Kant’s words: “He 
[the fantast] sees things which do not agree with the senses of others, 
which a reasonable man would promptly notice” (AA 25.2: 1014); and 
this, quite undeniably, is also common to poets. But, Kant proceeds, 
“he [the fantast] does not let himself be disturbed by this and does not 
discern if his senses do not concur with those of others” (1014). As to 
the poet, however, he is indeed the owner of an initially unbridled fan-
tasy; but ultimately this fantasy is controlled through a disposition of 
the powers of the mind especially conceived for this purpose, whereas 
the demented “fears his own fantasy, he knows that he is wrong, but 
the images which spontaneously spring forth in him are not in his 
power, and he must cede to his affection as to his manner of thinking” 
(AA 25.2: 1014). Now, if this is the case, then the demented, seized by 
the sensus proprius of his understanding, produces untruthful, even 
absurd representations, whereas in the poet the special disposition of his 
powers, along with the sensus communis, renders his images truthful and 
hence universally communicable and understandable. The poet, one could 
say, passes off as a man of follies but in him, and in his controlled irra-
tionality, the images end up composing the ground of active humanity. 
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They are, even in their novelty, even in their awkwardness, intimate 
cognition of the human community. The man of follies may even pass off 
as a poet, but with the difference that he can never leave the whirlwind 
of representations in his spirit; they serve his purposes only, and there-
fore can only be communicated to, as well as understood, by him. 
Keywords: Immanuel Kant, mental disorder, imagination, sensus communis, poetry. 
Summary:
According to Kant, folly directly depends on the human capacity to imagine, i.e. 
the capacity to adequately connect or disconnect, through the power of imagina-
tion, object, and representation. Likewise, the sane use of the productive power of 
imagination and its characteristic forces all depend on a singular connection between 
object and representation, and their respective presentation. 
The problem, however, lies in the quasi-indistinction between these two modes of 
human representation, which are based upon one and the same imaginative capacity 
(the Einbildungsfähigkeit) and must be referred to by two analogous, yet ultimately 
different, uses of the latter. It is Kant’s view that between both courses of human 
imagination — that of genius and that of folly, and the powers of the spirit they 
resort to — there are common processes, but also a threshold that the supplanting 
of which distinguishes these two imaginative applications of representations. This 
threshold is not a mere division, rather it is a hybrid beam of mutual appropriations 
and concessions between the two courses of human representativeness. 
I argue that, according to Kant, such a singular space is that of the complex, non-
linear relation between universality and individual-subjectivity, between health 
and illness, in a word, between the truth and falsehood of human representations. 
As such, I wish to diverge from studies which fully separate Kant’s theory of sane 
imagination from his positions on disturbed imagination. Instead, I propose that 
these have a common basis, are inter-dependent, and that they are only inverse in 
their application. Furthermore, I wish to expound how precisely genius and folly 
demonstrate the faint uniting-dissociative character of these two applications of 
human imagination. Finally, it is my aim to show how genius and folly, in their 
apparent indistinction, succeed in portraying the private, egoist vision of the dis-
turbed (sensus proprius) and the philanthropic, cosmopolitan view of the poet (sensus 
communis), thus once and for all dissociating sane and insane human imagination.
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